FDI may help rival firms by Ishida, Junichiro & Matsushima, Noriaki
Osaka University
Title FDI may help rival firms
Author(s)Ishida, Junichiro; Matsushima, Noriaki
CitationEconomics Bulletin. 6(22) P.1-P.7
Issue Date2005-11
Text Versionpublisher
URL http://hdl.handle.net/11094/3130
DOI
Rights
FDI may help rival firms 
Junichiro Ishida Noriaki Matsushima
Osaka University Kobe University
Abstract
This paper presents a two−country model of duopolistic market with vertical relations which
leads to a paradoxical result: when upstream firms possess sufficient bargaining power,
cost−reducing FDI may actually enhance the rival firm's profit.
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1 Introduction
In standard Cournot models of oligopoly with no external effect, a firm engaging in cost-reducing
investment is always a threat to other rival firms. The same conclusion applies for multicountry models
of international oligopoly where firms potentially undertake foreign direct investment (hereafter, FDI).
In this context, FDI plays exactly the same role as cost-reducing investment in the foreign market as
it allows the firm to save transport costs including tariffs and various non-tariff trade barriers. With
the firm gaining more efficiency in the foreign market through FDI, rival firms are inevitably made
worse off since they are now able to make less profit in the foreign market.
In this paper we construct a two-country model of duopoly with vertical relations and show that
this seemingly robust conclusion can be overturned once strategic price-setting behavior of upstream
firms is explicitly taken into account. Suppose that a firm undertakes FDI and becomes more efficient
in the foreign market. While this fact itself is certainly detrimental to the rival firm, the story does not
end here when profit-maximizing upstream input suppliers have sufficient bargaining power. Facing
more intense competition, there arises an incentive for the upstream input supplier of the rival firm
to lower input prices in order to compete in the foreign market. As we will see shortly, this strategic
reduction in input prices is sometimes large enough to compensate for the loss arising from more
intense competition in the foreign market.
There are now several papers which examine the relationship between unionization and FDI.1 In
those previous studies, however, the effect of FDI on its domestic rival firms has not been investigated.
In the sense that strategic price-setting behavior of upstream input suppliers leads to a paradoxical
result in an otherwise standard model of oligopolistic market, the result obtained here is also related
to Naylor (2002) who shows that industry profits can increase with the number of firms in the market.
In this paper we take a different route and present a situation where cost-reducing FDI can actually
increase its rival firm’ profits without any external effect assumed explicitly.
2 The model
The model is a slightly modified version of Lommerud et al. (2003). We consider two countries,
countries H (home) and F (foreign), and two downstream producers, firms A and B. Initially, each
firm has a plant located in country H.2 To export to country F , a firm must incur a per unit transport
1See, for instance, Bughin and Vannini (1995), Zhao (1995), Leahy and Montagna (2000), Skaksen and Sørensen
(2001), Naylor and Santoni (2003), and Lommerud et al. (2003).
2This is a difference from Lommerud et al. (2003) where one firm is initially located in country H while the other is
in country F .
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cost, denoted by t ≥ 0.3 To avoid the corner solution, we assume that the transport cost is sufficiently
small:
t ≤ t ≡ 160(31− 15
√
2)(1− w¯)
3577
' 0.4378(1− w¯). (1)
This condition assures that the firms choose nonnegative quantities to export in equilibrium. Within
this setup, we look at a situation where FDI is potentially undertaken by firm A: more precisely, firm
A may set up another plant in country F , which allows it to avoid the transport cost. Since our interest
lies in the external effect of FDI, we do not consider its fixed cost, at least for a moment.
There is only one factor of production, which we refer to as the input. Each firm procures its
input from its own (plant-specific) upstream input supplier and produces a homogenous final good
in a constant-returns-to-scale process where one unit of the input is turned into one unit of the final
good. If firm A chooses to set up a plant in country F , it must procure its input from a foreign input
supplier: that is, the number of input suppliers varies depending on firm A’s FDI decision.4 Let zji
denote the amount of the input supplied by the input supplier of firm i located in country j. Each
input supplier sets a wholesale price wji to maximize its profit function:
U
j
i = (w
j
i − w¯)zji , i = A,B, j = H,F, (2)
where w¯ < 1 is the marginal cost of producing a unit of the input, which is identical for all input
suppliers.5
We assume that competition between the two firms is Cournot and adopt the segmented market
hypothesis: both firms thus choose separate quantities for the two markets. Now let xji denote i’s sales
in country j. The inverse demand function in the two countries is symmetric and given by
pj = 1− (xjA + xjB), j = H,F, (3)
where pj is the price of the final good in country j.
To summarize, we model the game structure as follows:
1. Firm A decides whether to set up a plant in country F ;
2. Each upstream input supplier sets its wholesale price;
3. Given this, each firm simultaneously chooses quantities.
3Among other things, the transport cost is meant to capture tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers.
4It should be noted, however, that it is not critical how firm A procures its input in country F . The same result can
be obtained if the firm procures its input at the competitive price, as assumed in Lommerud et al. (2003).
5If the input supplier is a labor union, w¯ can be considered as the competitive (non-union) wage level.
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3 Analysis
Notice that the model has fairly standard features: (i) the firms produce a homogenous final good
(perfect substitute); (ii) the production technology is independent between the firms (no productive
externality). Under this setup, since FDI makes firm A more efficient in country F , it appears that
FDI undertaken by firm A can only be detrimental to its rival, firm B. We now show that, quite
contrary to this intuition, this is not necessarily the case and the external effect of FDI can actually
be positive under certain conditions.
3.1 No FDI
Suppose first that firm A chooses to remain entirely in country H. In this case, there are two input
suppliers to be considered, both located in country H. Given the wholesale prices (wHA and w
H
B ) set
by each of the two input suppliers, each firm maximizes
xHi , x
F
i = arg max
xH
i
,xF
i
[(1− (xHi + xH−i)− wHi )xHi + (1− (xFi + xF−i)− wHi − t)xFi ], i 6= −i. (4)
Solving the first-order conditions, we obtain
xHi =
1− 2wHi + wH−i
3
, xFi =
1− 2wHi + wH−i − t
3
. (5)
When t is in the appropriate range, the optimal input price is obtained as a solution to the following
problem:6
max
wH
i
UHi = (w
H
i − w¯)(xHi + xFi ) =
(wHi − w¯)(2− 4wHi + 2wH−i − t)
3
. (6)
The first-order condition then implies
∂UHi
∂wHi
= 0 ⇔ 2 + 4w¯ − t− 8w
H
i + 2w
H
−i
3
= 0, (7)
which leads to
wHi =
2 + 4w¯ − t
6
. (8)
In equilibrium, therefore, each firm chooses
xHi =
4(1− w¯) + t
18
, xFi =
4(1− w¯)− 5t
18
. (9)
Finally, the equilibrium profit with no FDI, piiN , is computed as
piiN =
16(1− w¯)2 − 16(1− w¯)t+ 13t2
162
. (10)
6We can show that the solution to this problem indeed maximizes the union’s utility. The proof is available upon
request.
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3.2 FDI
Now suppose that firm A chooses to set up a new plant in country F to avoid the transport cost.
In this case, there are three input suppliers to be considered, two in country H and one in country
F . Given the wholesale prices (wHA , w
H
B and w
F
A) set by each of the three input suppliers, each firm
maximizes
xHA , x
F
A = arg max
xH
A
,xF
A
[(1− (xHA + xHB )− wHA )xHA + (1− (xFA + xFB)− wFA)xFA], (11)
xHB , x
F
B = arg max
xH
B
,xF
B
[(1− (xHA + xHB )− wHB )xHB + (1− (xFA + xFB)− wHB − t)xFB]. (12)
Solving the first-order conditions, we obtain
xHA =
1− 2wHA + wHB
3
, xFA =
1− 2wFA + wHB + t
3
, (13)
xHB =
1 + wHA − 2wHB
3
, xFB =
1− 2(wHB + t) + wFA
3
. (14)
Given this, each input supplier maximizes
UHA = (w
H
A − w¯)xHA =
(wHA − w¯)(1− 2wHA + wHB )
3
, (15)
UHB = (w
H
B − w¯)(xHB + xFB) =
(wHB − w¯)(2 + wHA − 4wHB − 2t+ wFA)
3
, (16)
UFA = (w
F
A − w¯)xFA =
(wFA − w¯)(1− 2wFA + wHB + t)
3
. (17)
The first-order conditions then imply
∂UHA
∂wHA
= 0 ⇔ 1 + 2w¯ − 4w
H
A + w
H
B
3
= 0, (18)
∂UHB
∂wHB
= 0 ⇔ 2 + 4w¯ − 2t+ w
H
A − 8wHB + wFA
3
= 0, (19)
∂UFA
∂wFA
= 0 ⇔ 1 + 2w¯ + t+ w
H
B − 4wFA
3
= 0, (20)
which lead to
wHA =
40 + 80w¯ − 7t
120
, wHB =
10 + 20w¯ − 7t
30
, wFA =
40 + 80w¯ + 23t
120
. (21)
In equilibrium, therefore, each firm chooses
xHA =
40(1− w¯)− 7t
180
, xFA =
40(1− w¯) + 23t
180
, (22)
xHB =
80(1− w¯) + 49t
360
, xFB =
80(1− w¯)− 161t
360
. (23)
Finally, the equilibrium profit with FDI, piiF , is computed as
piAF =
1600(1− w¯)2 + 640(1− w¯)t+ 289t2
16200
, piBF =
6400(1− w¯)2 − 8960(1− w¯)t+ 14161t2
64800
. (24)
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3.3 External effects of FDI
We are now ready to examine how firm B’s profit is affected by firm A’s FDI. To this end, define
∆pi(t) ≡ piBF − piBN = −t(2560(1− w¯)− 8961t)
64800
. (25)
Then, FDI undertaken by firm A benefits firm B if ∆pi(t) > 0. We can now state the following result.
Proposition 1 There exists some nonempty interval T ≡ (t, t] such that ∆pi(t) > 0 for all t ∈ T .
Proof: We can show this by simple algebra. It directly follows from (25) that ∆pi(t) > 0 if and only
if
t >
2560(1− w¯)
8961
≡ t. (26)
Given this it is immediate to verify t < t.
Q.E.D.
By setting up a new plant in country F , firm A can save the transport cost and becomes more
efficient by this margin. The proposition suggests that this cost-reducing FDI can actually be beneficial
for the rival firm when the transport cost is sufficiently large. This result is counterintuitive in two
respects: first, cost-reducing investment may actually help its rival firm; second, this positive external
effect is more likely to occur when FDI is more effective.7
The logic behind this result is as follows. In standard Cournot models of oligopolistic market, the
presence of a more efficient firm is always detrimental to other rival firms. Besides this conventional
effect, however, FDI undertaken by firm A also gives rise to effects that work in favor of firm B. To
see this, figure 1 depicts how firm A’s FDI affects the wholesale prices that prevail in country H as
the transport cost increases. When firm A undertakes FDI, the input supplier of firm B is put under
pressure to lower the wholesale price in order to export. This downward pressure on the wholesale price
is naturally stronger when the transport cost is larger. An increase in the transport cost thus leads to a
downward shift in the reaction function of wHB (the arrow in the figure indicates an increase in t). There
are two points to be noted as to what this shift brings about. First, the wholesale price in country
H, wHB , is monotonically decreasing in the transport cost, which certainly benefits firm B. Second,
it should also be noted that the reaction function of wHA is totally independent of the transport cost,
because firm A does not export. This asymmetry virtually puts firm B in an advantageous position in
country H as it faces a lower wholesale price than its rival, i.e., wHB < w
H
A when t > 0. The proposition
7Note that in the current setup, the marginal value of FDI is equivalent to the transport cost.
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states that the gain from this downward pressure on the wholesale prices eventually dominates the
loss arising from facing more intense competition in the foreign market as the transport cost becomes
larger.
wHB
wHA
wHB (w
H
A )
wHA (w
H
B )
0
Figure 1: Reaction functions under FDI (upstream firms)
This rather paradoxical result also leads to a paradoxical implication. Suppose that FDI now
involves some fixed cost: let Ci denote the fixed cost of FDI by firm i. Suppose further that piAF−piAN ≥
CA while CB is prohibitively large so that firm B never undertakes FDI. In this case, the unique
equilibrium outcome is that only firm A undertakes FDI. Given this, if ∆pi(t) > 0, there may arise a
case where
piBF > piAF − CA ≥ piAN = piBN . (27)
When this condition holds, the more efficient firm actually ends up with less profit in this unique
equilibrium outcome.
4 Conclusion
This paper presents a two-country model of duopoly with vertical relations and examines how FDI
undertaken by a firm affects for its rival firm. We have shown that, contrary to the conventional
wisdom, cost-reducing FDI can actually benefit the rival firm through its effect on input prices when
upstream firms possess sufficient bargaining power.
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